

Ethical Record

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The Proceedings of the



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The views expressed in this journal are not necessarily those of the Society.

Looking back 100 years: the women musicians of Conway Hall's past

Guest Editor: **Jessica Beck**

During a speech to an audience at the South Place Ethical Society in 1924, Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner claimed that the part played by women in the society had been generally ignored. In a year that marks the centenary of women's right to vote in the UK, it feels particularly important to reflect on this statement and, with a 'better late than never' approach, attempt to give a small group of women their deserved recognition.

Out of the group of musical women who I have chosen to research over the past two years, one of the most interesting was Josephine Troup (1853-1913) who devoted much of her life to supporting the musical activities at South Place. In contrast to the pop songs usually sung at Sunday Assembly today, congregations at South Place (who moved to Conway Hall in 1929) met to sing from "ethical" hymn books. Many of these were specially written, compiled and funded by Troup, who was praised for her exceptional musical talents at the special memorial service held in her honour at the South Place Chapel.

As well as creating the hymn books, Josephine also lectured, took part in fundraising events, distributed advertisements, wrote extra music specifically for children in ethical societies, composed chamber music and performed regularly in the early years of the Sunday chamber music concerts. She was a shining example of the many women from the early 1900s who took up multiple roles to ensure the society's musical success, following in the footsteps of Sarah and Eliza Flower and forging a path for the women of the future.

As I am fast approaching the end of my PhD research, I am keen to find ways to ensure that the memories of women like Josephine Troup are secured for those who want to find them, and not lost in the archives once more. My goals for this year are to share their talents in a way that will connect with the Conway Hall audience and bring their music back to life. Consequently, I am currently formulating a plan to produce a 2018 concert in honour of their work... watch this space!

Wishing you all happy New Year and a successful 2018!




Jessica Beck is currently undertaking an AHRC-funded collaborative doctoral award at the Royal Northern College of Music, supervised by Professor Barbara Kelly, Professor David Amigoni and Dr Jim Walsh (CEO of Conway Hall). Her research is based on the archives held at Conway Hall that relate to its own musical history, with a particular focus on the role of women between 1887 and 1927. You can keep up to date with her work on the Conway Hall website.

A THINKING ON SUNDAY LECTURE, 12 November 2017 (Remembrance Day)

The Inglorious Dead of WWII

Chris Bratcher




A CALL FOR RECOGNITION

The UK's combatant "Glorious Dead" of WWI and subsequent engagements are commemorated at the Cenotaph, and by the Unknown Warrior's tomb in Westminster Abbey, and those of former conflicts in

regimental plaques in churches across the country, but there is no equivalent Citizens' Cenotaph for non-combatants killed in our many wars. There are very few commemorative sites for British casualties in a particular locality, such as Coventry Cathedral, that also give due recognition of slaughter on our part as well. I wear a

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white poppy to remember all who died, without the need for distinction between friends and supposed foes.

There is a deafening official silence today about the deaths of countless non-combatant foreign folk killed by airstrikes in Iraq and Syria - bar a recent ludicrous denial that there were *any* such casualties from British precision bombing, unlike other air-forces. It is all of a piece with the asymmetry of recognition of what transpired in WWII, where, on an altogether vaster scale, we inflicted far more non-combatant casualties than we suffered, and deliberately so.

President Trump's threats of Armageddon in South East Asia reminds us, particularly today, of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but probably more as evidence of what nuclear warfare might inflict, than for those bombings' dubious justification. We have all heard of the bombing designed to incinerate Dresden in a firestorm, but because it is the only such event commonly cited in accounts of the war, it is easy to quarantine it as a single horror; perhaps as an aberration. But a hundred or more cities, and many times that number of small towns, principally in Germany but across the entire European theatre of war, suffered massive aerial bombardment in WWII, resulting in an estimated 600,000 civilian dead in Germany alone and millions seriously injured: only now are historians assembling the facts, from Bulgaria in the East to Heligoland in the North Sea. Far more Frenchmen died of it than from German occupation or in combat (or here in the Blitz, commonly thought of as a uniquely British experience and as an example of special British grit). An account of this slaughter needs to be conveyed to the present generation of young people, *along with* the tales of bravery and "sacrifice", including those of the bomber crews, that they hear in the run up to Remembrance Sunday, year upon year.

IN THE BEGINNING

How did it come to such a pass? To judge it fully, we need to know the detailed history. There was a marked change in the British military's approach to civilian bombing as the war went on. Both Britain and Germany had declared on 1st September 1939 that they would attack only military objectives. The Air Ministry ruled that it was illegal to attack targets in which civilians might be "negligently" killed, and the rules of engagement drawn up for all armed forces stated "it is clearly illegal to bombard a populated area in the hope of hitting a legitimate target".

Pre-war public opinion considered indiscriminate bombing barbaric, and something only the Germans would do; the last thing anyone wanted was to break the understanding reached and bring on mutually assured destruction. For unilateral prudential reasons (which no doubt Britain shared), the French were insistent at the outset that the RAF should not attack German cities whilst the balance of airpower so obviously favoured Germany and their own cities were poorly protected.

Raids restricted to naval targets in the "phoney war" had each cost between 30-50% aircraft casualties, and Bomber Command was ordered to operate chiefly at night. The only operations permitted in German airspace were night raids dropping millions of leaflets, often in bundles to get rid of them fast, and were wildly inaccurate. The RAF admitted that hitting anything at night "will be largely a matter of chance". The Air Ministry recognised that Bomber Command lacked the technology or experience to back up its longstanding claims to bomb accurately.

In March 1940, a German raid on the Scapa Flow naval base killed a crofter, the first British civilian casualty. Churchill bizarrely berated the Ministry for not publicising it as the likely start of "deliberate horror raids on civilians" and RAF chiefs in the War Cabinet argued that Britain should make "anticipatory attacks" because Germany was bound, sooner or later, to commence indiscriminate bombing: the first appearance of a so-called doctrine of "pre-emptive retaliation", that was to be repeated in the Cold War by advocates of a nuclear "first strike". But Chamberlain's Cabinet held firm: the Minister for Air, in a broadcast to the nation in late April, said "We will not bomb open towns; we will not attempt to defeat the Germans by terrorising their women and children".

When France was collapsing at the end of May, Bomber Command was ordered to end their (very reluctant) support of the land battle because of their disastrous losses when up against a technologically superior German air-force. Given the existing policy and outcomes, what was to be done with the bomber fleet?

HOW MORAL CONSIDERATIONS GET ERODED

In June 1940, the Ministry issued new guidelines: the intentional killing of civilians was still regarded as a violation of international law, but attacks could be made on military targets "in the widest sense" in which

civilian casualties were unavoidable but should be “proportionate”, and “undue loss of life” was still to be avoided, to the point of jettisoning bombs or returning with them if the target could not be identified, much to the vexation of Bomber Command.

Then, on 30th October 1940, the newly appointed head of the RAF, and former head of Bomber Command, Portal, finally got his way, and they were redirected to focus on enemy morale by causing “heavy material destruction” in large towns “to teach the German population what bombing could do”. International law was set aside. This decision was taken before the bombing of Coventry (an industrial target) on 14th November 1940, which the Germans saw as a reprisal for the immediate bombing of Munich, which was not. Arguing over who started it gets us nowhere, whether on Remembrance Sunday or not.

THE BOMBER COMMAND CATECHISM

What had prevailed was a long-standing belief that had determined Bomber Command’s pre-war equipping and possible deployment and made it a markedly separate entity within the RAF (unlike other air forces), frequently at odds with the rest of the military, and potentially a loose cannon. The doctrine of indiscriminate bombing of an enemy population in order to terminally damage its morale, supposedly to induce an ill-defined “it” to give up and surrender, was a main plank, even the rationale, for its existence.

When war broke out, Bomber Command claimed that a planned series of sorties would bring the industrial heart of Germany, the Ruhr, “practically to a standstill” in a matter of weeks; “it contains, moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under intensive air attack. Such attacks would involve a heavy casualty rate amongst civilians, including women and children”. In May 1940, Trenchard, the veteran former head of the Air-Force (and buddy of Haig in WWI) bemoaned the fact that it had not been given the green light “when I and others think it probably would have ended the war by now”; effectively, before it had begun. This raises all sorts of questions of morality.

MORALITY

The straightforward, absolute position is that civilians not engaged in any sort of war work (which would stretch, for example, to railwaymen) are sacrosanct:

the numbers deliberately or negligently killed, whatever the motive, is irrelevant, just as in peace-time. “Proportionality” – whatever that is to mean in context – doesn’t enter into it. Or one can take the position that war – or the war in question – is an absolute evil and therefore any action from a motive to shorten it is validated.

But without really good prior evidence that means would achieve an end, however desirable, the motive is empty. Even if there were such evidence, before or after the onset, do the actual effects destroy any utilitarian argument for it? And what of the incalculable post-conflict consequences? The issue was to re-arise in Korea and Vietnam, for example. The bare concept of war-shortening is indeterminate as a measure of time or effect; how short is a piece of string unravelling into the future, and what hangs on the bit excised?

There is also the disconnect between what soldiers would refuse to do on moral grounds (or not be asked to do) face-to-face, and what, remote from their casualties, they will do in aerial/drone warfare. War crimes are highly selective.

EVIDENCE

The first point to make is that there was no evidence, only the plans presuming success, that the Ruhr could be obliterated or, that if it were, Germany’s ability to continue the war would be at an end; or that the German population in particular (a common pre-war assumption) would crack, whatever *that* meant, and with that desired consequence.

As to the former claim, the evidence was not long in coming. Concerned by the gap between aircrew reports of success and the reality, Churchill’s scientific advisor, Lord Cherwell, set up a review of the photographic evidence. The devastating conclusions were published in August 1941. In the best of conditions, only two fifths of bombers found their targets; on moonless nights, only one in fifteen; and of those that did, only a third placed their bombs within five miles of them. Despite this, in September Portal sent Churchill a plan to bomb Germany’s 45 largest cities, claiming this time that this would end the war in six months. Churchill responded: “It is very debatable whether bombing by itself will be a decisive factor... the most we can say is that it will be a heavy annoyance”; and further, anyway the British population had anyway shown that being bombed merely “stimulated and strengthened civilian resistance”.



As to the consequences of “cracking”, there was growing evidence in the latter stages of the war that pounding a population simply numbed the survivors and, if anything, disabled them from any concerted challenge to the State, on which they then relied for food, shelter and survival. They were certainly not in any position to overthrow Hitler. So much was obvious but didn’t fit the narrative.

BEYOND THE PALE

“Area bombing” or “carpet, saturation or obliteration bombing” – call it what you will – was finally unleashed in March 1942 with the advent of the Lancaster bomber, a new Bomber Commander, Harris, and a new mission: “the *primary object* of your operations should now be focused on the *morale of the enemy civil population*”. Bomber Command had long smarted under the Cabinet perception that it was ineffective and wanted to take the opportunity to try the effect of incendiaries – small bombs containing magnesium, phosphorus and petroleum jelly. The Baltic town of Lubeck was chosen as a test case because it had many medieval, timbered buildings, and offered the pretext that it had a U-boat training station; followed by another wooden town, Rostock. Just a thousand people died in one night in Lubeck; Rostock was 70% destroyed in three sorties.

The Germans were outraged; on the morrow after the attack on Rostock, a minister announced “we shall go out and bomb every building marked with three stars in the Baedeker guide”, thus giving their retaliatory raids on English Cathedral cities their name.

Harris had bigger aspirations: by May, he was able to mount his first ever thousand bomber raid – his entire force committed on one throw – on Cologne, to try to prove his point. Over 600 acres were flattened,

and 13,000 buildings destroyed, and was regarded as a much needed piece of good news for the Home Front; but with less deaths than in Lubeck, thanks to the extraordinary efficiency of German air-raid precautions and shelters.

I will not numb you with the list of places and statistics of the devastation and deaths through the rest of 1942, or later years. Two repeat raids in 1943 on Cologne, with 600 bombers, destroyed the homes of 350,000 people; five nights of “Operation Gomorrah” – the bombing of Hamburg – in July of that year, left 45,000 identifiable corpses. Suffice to say that by the end of 1943, Harris’s theory that intense bombing could win or shorten the war had long since been abandoned by Churchill, the War cabinet and Portal. It became evident that German industrial production continued to rise, until close to the end of the war.

Fast forward to September 1944, when crucially Bomber Command ceased to be under orders from Eisenhower following the Allied landing in France, the Luftwaffe could not give air defence and the war was clearly about to be won. Harris wrote to Churchill complaining that “the Germans had been given a breather” and asked permission to “knock Germany finally flat”. Instead, he was given a new directive: expressly to regard oil installations and communications as his primary objective and only secondarily the “general industrial capacity” of Germany, effectively cities, left open to him as an option when, *in his operational view*, weather conditions were too poor to attack the former. This was all he needed. Only 6% of his command’s bombs were directed against oil targets in the rest of the war. Devastated Cologne was area bombed again three times in October, turning rubble to powder.

Portal immediately strengthened the directive, as oil supply was crucial, and Harris fell back on the weather excuse and a claim that aircraft losses would be greater if he concentrated on oil installations, saying that “bombing anything in Germany was better than bombing nothing” and asking to be dismissed if he couldn’t get his way: furthermore, he said there remained just 15 German cities left on his “city programme” – including Dresden.

And so it came to pass on 13th February 1945, after ten days of poor weather that were supposed to be the only excuse for returning to area bombing, 650,000 incendiaries were dropped on Dresden, creating a firestorm that wiped out the city, killing 25,000 people. Accompanying American bombers instead targeted the railway marshalling yards, that served people

fleeing from the Russians – and theoretically, any troop movements eastwards.

American public opinion was horrified when an RAF officer at Allied HQ told the press that they were employing a strategy of “deliberate terror bombing”; but the press storm there was censored here. The Americans, however, did exactly that in “their” theatre of war, against Japan, from March 1945: more people (85,000) died in the first such incendiary raid on Tokyo, than were killed by the atomic bombs on Hiroshima/Nagasaki that August.

Harris then bombed most of his remaining list, before Churchill stepped in in a minute on 28th March: “It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing German cities for the sake of increasing terror, *though under other pretexts*, should be reviewed”. He was also concerned to preserve an economically functional future West Germany able to survive a battle against the allure of communism. End of story, and the beginning of another. Bomber Command’s next job was ferrying aid to the survivors of its own actions - you couldn’t make it up!

In my opinion, the shared horror and suffering, an experience that the UK in comparison only patchily underwent for short periods in the war, was the main driver to unity across Continental Europe that spawned the EU. The desire over there for it is commonly met here with nationalistic emotional incomprehension. Brexit is rooted in a “little England” account, restricted to what we suffered on their behalf

and how “we” won. We should do what we can to ensure a future generation hears the other side of war.

READING MATTER

- “Among the Dead Cities”, by A.C.Grayling. Bloomsbury, 2006. The case for the prosecution: both a detailed, and chillingly tabled, historical account, and a fine analysis of the moral issues.
- “The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945, by Richard Overy, Penguin; published in the U.S.A as “The Bombers and the Bombed”: Allied Air war over Europe 1940 -1945, Viking, 2014. The definitive account by the foremost historian of the Air War, (e.g., his earlier “Why the Allies Won”, 1995, and “Bomber Command” 1939-1945, 1997, and his contribution to the following):.
- “Firestorm”: the bombing of Dresden, 1945, ed. Addison & Craig, Pimlico, 2006. Nine essays by historians covering the detail, the “war crime” issue and why Dresden matters.
- “Dresden, Tuesday 13 February, 1945”, by F Taylor, 2004; an account that tries to some extent justify what happened.
- The Fire, by Jorg Friedrich (Eng translation 2006): the New York Times said the book “describes in stark, unrelenting detail what happened in city after city as the Allies dropped 80 million incendiary bombs on Germany”; and “Fire Sites”, a photographic record reviewed in the Guardian, 20 October 2003.

OBITUARY

Beatrice (Beatty) Feder (1921 – 2017)

We regret to report the death on 11th October 2017 of Beatty Feder, aged 96.

Beatty had been a long-time member of the Ethical Society and was a keen attender at the Sunday morning lectures.

Latterly, because of increasing deafness, she always hoped for plenty to read on the screen. When I picked her up from her flat in South Hampstead on the way to Conway Hall, we used to stop by the giraffe house in the Outer Circle of Regents Park to watch the giraffes striding about - “Aren’t they lovely” she used to say.

Beatty was very well-read; she had studied shorthand and typing and had done secretarial work for the Fabian Society. She was a fervent rationalist and a member of the National Secular Society. She is survived by her nephew, David Feder.

Norman Bacrac

Ernestine Rose: an Atheist Pioneer

Bill Cooke



Springtime in Boston. April 1861. The United States is bitterly divided. Cultural wars have festered for several decades around questions of how American democracy should look. What were the limits of democracy? Should blacks be able to participate in the democratic process. What about women? What role should religion play in government and in society? In only a few days the most explosive of these faultlines would plunge the country into the worst disaster of its history. This was the question of slavery. For more than twenty years a vocal minority had energised the sluggish majority in the northern states to recognise that slavery was wrong. It was wrong morally and it was wrong socially. Whether it was wrong religiously was still the most divisive and vexed aspect of this most difficult issue. Foremost among these campaigners was Ernestine Rose (1810-1891). But, unlike the majority of abolitionist campaigners, Ernestine Rose saw the bigger picture. Freeing women from oppression was linked intimately to freeing slaves from oppression.

And any freedom from oppression meant nurturing a free mind.

From her earliest days as a child in the short-lived Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Ernestine Potowska was made aware of the contest between progress and reaction. The Grand Duchy was created by Napoleon out of the western parts of Poland seized by Prussia in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Few people valued the comparative freedoms of Napoleonic Europe more than Jews. After centuries of subjection to Christian anti-Semitism, for a brief few years, Jews could dream of a future free from hatred. Ranged against this promise of progress and freedom were the forces of reaction, championed by the twin pillars: autocracy and organised religion. The Hebrew Bible of her upbringing and the Christian Bible of the societies she spent her adult years in pulsed with restrictions: on how to behave, on what to think, and on who to associate with. Rose's latest biographer is correct to say that, for someone raised an orthodox Jew there was



Bill Cooke is a historian of atheism and humanism. Among his books are *The Blasphemy Depot*, the centennial history of the Rationalist Association, *A Rebel to His Last Breath*, a biography of Joseph McCabe, a *Dictionary of Atheism, Skepticism and Humanism*, and *A Wealth of Insights: Humanist Thought Since the Enlightenment*. He teaches philosophy and religious studies at Priestley College in Warrington.

no serious option between full observance or atheism. Potowska chose atheism, which meant emancipation from the most fundamental of the restrictions which hemmed in her, and everyone else's, life.

To this day, many Christians remain in denial about the extent of support given to slavery by followers of Jesus. Even during Rose's lifetime, apologists like Charles Loring Brace (1826-1890) were airbrushing any taint of heterodoxy out of the story of emancipation. Many Southern clergymen were content to discredit the case for abolition simply by claiming one could only be an infidel to make such an outlandish claim. So corrosive was this charge that many convinced abolitionists were anxious to deflect it by distancing the movement from any suggestion of links to distinctly non-religious, let alone atheist, arguments.

So for Ernestine Rose to rise to prominence in the American abolitionist movement is something remarkable. Because Ernestine Rose was a Jew, a woman, a foreigner and an infidel: the worst nightmare of many a defender of slavery. It is important to recognise that these were not incidental qualities; they were seen by many of her opponents as root and branch the reason she argued as she did. In the face of provocations such as this, some opponents of Rose did not scruple to inflate still further the abuse. The best known of these was a clergyman in Maine who, under the cloak of anonymity, declared "it would be shameful to listen to this woman, a thousand times below a prostitute." (*Bangor Mercury* Nov 3, 1855). When not being openly abused, other critics preferred to condescend. Rose's accent, her gloves, the ringlets in her hair; anything was commented on as a means to belittle her and keep the focus on her otherness. Even among supporters of abolition, many were nervous about being linked in public with infidels like Ernestine Rose. It is to the great credit of Susan B Anthony and other leaders of the movement that this timid counsel of excluding Rose from the speaking platform was ignored.

The reason Ernestine Rose retained her prominent position in the movement was a simple one: she was an outstanding communicator and spoke with an authenticity that makes connections. Year in and year out Rose defended, extended and articulated the related causes of abolitionism and women's rights. In the face of provocation over such a long period, it is hardly surprising that Rose did not speak on atheism more often. The freethought movement was only just finding its way and did not meet that often. But when

a freethought meeting was convened at the Mercantile Hall in Boston in 1861, Rose thought it time to speak openly about her atheism. *A Defence of Atheism* turned out to be one of the most authentic, cogent and convincing expressions of atheism ever written.

ATHEISM BEFORE 1861

Before we look at what Rose said, we need first to survey the intellectual world she would have been exposed to. The core principles of Rose's atheism were set before she emigrated to the United States in 1836. Rose's biographers all emphasise the influence of Robert Owen (1771-1858) on Rose's life and thought. Her years in England were a time of freethought ferment and she quickly immersed herself in the Owenite movement, which offered her a rich, passionate and varied education. Owen's book, *A New View of Society* (1816) was a radical call for a new set of values around education, social care, bans on child labour and alleviating the worst forms of inequality. The following year, in a speech in London, Owen announced his independence from religious belief. This was a scandal to many, an inspiring act of courage to many others.

But while Owen's influence was certainly great, Rose was more than just another Owenite. While Owen supplied much of the ethical *motivation* for her atheism, the actual arguments came from a broader field. Prominent among the freethought champions of this period was Richard Carlile (1790-1843), who spent more than nine years in prison between 1817 and 1835, defending the rights of free speech. Closely bound up with Carlile was the presence of heroic female freethinkers who cannot but have inspired the young refugee. While Carlile was incarcerated, his common-law wife Eliza Sharples Carlile (c. 1805-1852) courageously held the fort in his absence, becoming a prominent freethought lecturer in her own right. Also active at this time was Emma Martin (1812-1851), whose thoughts on women's rights mixed easily with her freethought principles.

From higher up the social ladder, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was a fierce critic of religion. The direct influence of these works is less clear, but at the very least, Rose is likely to have known of them. Still further up the social ladder Shelley's poem *Queen Mab*, a denunciation of tyranny and religion's role as an abettor to tyranny, was widely read. Less widely read was Shelley's short essay *The Necessity of Atheism*,

for which he was expelled from University College, Oxford on March 25th 1811.

As well as these current publications and lecturers, older freethought material was available. Works by, and summaries of, radicals like Spinoza, d'Holbach, Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft were circulating. While in France, Rose may well have come across the story of Olympe de Gouge (1748-1793). This remarkable woman wrote a play called *Negro Slavery* in 1774 which was far too radical to be published in the *ancien regime*. De Gouge quickly became disenchanted with the limitations of the emancipatory rhetoric of the French revolutionaries and so, in 1791, penned the *Declaration of the Rights of Woman*, a passionate appeal for equality of the sexes. She was guillotined in 1793 for satirising the revolution.

Once Rose was in the United States, she would have come across the American radicals: people like Ethan Allen, Elihu Palmer and Philip Freneau. All these men were deists, though, so it's not clear how much Rose would have learned from them that she had not already learned in England. The deist we know Rose responded warmly to was Thomas Paine, whose memory she passionately defended for her entire life.

ERNESTINE ROSE'S ATHEISM

Of the very few names specifically mentioned in the *Defence of Atheism*, the most significant is Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), who became a household name after his adventures in South America exploring volcanoes, collecting a vast range of plant specimens and measuring everything. After seeing Spanish mistreatment of slaves in South America, Humboldt became a staunch abolitionist. He saw, before anyone else, the link between slavery and colonialism and, quite apart from the moral objections, also understood slavery as a limiting and self-defeating way to manage an economy. Though adapted differently to the challenges of geography and climate, Humboldt insisted that all races were of "a common type".

Humboldt's celebrity mushroomed after the publication in 1845 of his enormously influential work, *Cosmos*. This was Humboldt's magnum opus, his big-picture account of the workings of nature and our place in it. The central theme of *Cosmos* was the inter-connectedness of all things. It was hard not to notice the complete absence of any mention of God in the book. Instead, Humboldt spoke of the "wonderful web of organic life." The second volume, which

appeared in 1847, then gave a magisterial history of humanity, placed in its natural surroundings.

It's when one looks at the structure of Rose's *Defence of Atheism* that Humboldt's impact is most clear. The 39 paragraphs of Rose's address follow the schema of *Cosmos*, which moved from the heavens, through the physical sciences to the social sciences and on to humanity's account of its situation.

- Paragraphs 2-7: physical sciences do not endorse theism
- Paragraphs 8-11: an account of social sciences and religion
- Paragraphs 11-16: Biblical account of creation
- Paragraphs 17-18: Christ's sacrifice and what it tells us
- Paragraph 19: summarises case so far.
- Paragraph 20: is her case unreasonable?
- Paragraphs 21-22: metaphysical arguments for God
- Paragraphs 23-26: argument to design
- Paragraphs 27-28: laws of nature, not Natural Law.
- Paragraph 29: superstition the enemy of knowledge.
- Paragraphs 30-32: universality of religion denied.
- Paragraphs 33-34: consequences of eliminated superstition.
- Paragraphs 35-37: morality does not depend on religion.
- Paragraphs 38-39: what atheism is.

The advantage of structuring an argument for atheism in this way is that everything is seen as a property of nature. It is not, as many religious apologists like to claim, a titanic contest between supernaturalism and naturalism. Supernatural thinking, like beetles, or battles, is just another property of the natural world.

Though not specifically named, traces of the influence two other important thinkers on Rose's address can be spotted. The first of them is Baron Paul d'Holbach (1723-1789). A strong indicator of d'Holbach's influence is the fundamental role Rose gives to motion as the inherent property of an indestructible matter. Early on in *A System of Nature*, d'Holbach speaks of motion in precisely this way. In many ways, *A Defence of Atheism* can be seen as a summary of *A System of Nature*.

It is interesting that Rose begins her survey of the sciences with geology. Since the publication of Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology* between 1830 and 1833, geology was propelled into the forefront of the culture wars. People now realised the vast antiquity of the earth, the natural forces that had fashioned it, and

the many species that had perished along the way. As Rose put it: "Geology speaks of the structure of the Earth, the formation of the different strata, of coal, of granite, of the whole mineral kingdom. It reveals the remains and traces of animals long extinct, but gives not clue whereby we may prove the existence of God." A great deal of Lyell's early inspiration came from Alexander Humboldt. Rose then proceeds through the hard sciences, arriving in each case at the same conclusion. Chemistry, for example ("Nature's great laboratory") reveals the "indestructibility of matter, and its inherent property – motion."

The next clear, though unnamed, influence becomes apparent when Rose moves on to the social sciences. Here the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) shows itself. In paragraphs eight to ten, having established the primacy of the natural order, Rose proceeds from the "universe of matter to the universe of mind". Whether beneficent or malevolent, mankind made God is its own image. "In describing his God, he delineated his own character: the picture he drew represents in living and ineffaceable colours the epoch of his existence – the period he lived in." Some of Rose's more memorable aphorisms have a Feuerbachian flavour as well, as when she says "Ignorance is the mother of Superstition."

Only after this account of the natural world, and the place of religion within it, does Rose venture into biblical criticism and responses to traditional theistic arguments for the existence of God. Here the influence of the English freethinkers and, indeed, her upbringing by an educated rabbi, are apparent. After outlining the Christian claim that we are saved through Christ's sacrifice, Rose ponders the problem of evil:

"Is the world saved? Saved! From what? From ignorance? It is all around us. From poverty, vice, crime, sin, misery and shame. It abounds everywhere. Look into your poor-houses, your prisons, your lunatic asylums; contemplate the whip, the instruments of torture, and of death; ask the murderer, or his victim; listen to the ravings of the maniac, the shrieks of distress, the groans of despair; mark the cruel deeds of the tyrant, the crimes of slavery, and the suffering of the oppressed; count the millions of lives lost by fire, by water, and by the sword; measure the blood spilled, the tears shed, the sighs of agony drawn from the expiring victims on the altar of fanaticism; and tell me from what the world was *saved*?"

Rhetoric as good as this only fully hits home when delivered in an authentic setting, by someone with

proper experience of the suffering she gives voice to. This was a core element of Rose's power.

The refutation of the classical arguments for the existence of god are relatively straightforward and conventional. Rose begins with the cosmological argument, then moves on to the first cause argument before spending most of her time on the argument to design. Nothing especially original is said here. She is at her best when she exposes the theistic claims about creation in the form of an argument based on personal incredulity:

"The mere fact of its existence does not prove a Creator. Then how came the Universe into existence? We do not know; but the ignorance of man is certainly no proof of the existence of a God. Yet upon that very ignorance has it been predicated, and is maintained." Rose also dispenses with the presumption that the inter-connected web of the universe presupposes a designer, something that would deny and break that very inter-connectedness.

"What is intelligence? It is not a thing, a substance, an existence in itself, but simply a property of matter, manifesting itself through organisations."

Humboldt would have loved that. So would Bertrand Russell. Rose also dispatches effectively the hoary old canard that the choice is between design and chance.

"Everything is wonderful, and wonderful just in proportion as we are ignorant; but that proves not 'design' or 'designer'. But did things come by chance? I am asked. Oh no. There is no such thing as chance. It exists only in the perverted mind of the believer, who, while insisting that God was the cause of everything, leaves *Him* without any cause."

Rose denies that morality depends somehow on God. Morality, she writes,

"depends on an accurate knowledge of the nature of man, of the laws that govern his being, the principles of right, or justice, and humanity, and the conditions requisite to make him healthy, rational, virtuous and happy."

In few passages of Rose's *Defence of Atheism* do the shades of Robert Owen burn more brightly than here.

In many ways, Rose's atheism comes together at this point, in one paragraph about two-thirds the way through her address. Here, in 96 words, Rose gives one of the finest summaries of the atheist world view ever written:

"The universe is one vast chemical laboratory, in constant operation, by her internal forces. The laws or principles of attraction, cohesion, and repulsion,

produce in never-ending succession the phenomena of composition, decomposition, and recombination. The *how*, we are too ignorant to understand, too modest to presume, and too honourable to profess. Had man been a patient, and impartial inquirer, and not with childish presumption attributed everything he could not understand to supernatural causes, given names to hide his ignorance, but observed the operations of nature, he would undoubtedly have known more, been wiser, and happier.”

Here Rose brings processes her understanding of Robert Owen and Alexander von Humboldt, of d’Holbach and Feuerbach and all the suffering she had encountered in her life, and all the hypocrisy and cant into an authentic and morally-focused epitome of naturalistic humility.

THE NATURE OF ERNESTINE ROSE’S ATHEISM

How, a century and a half later, do we assess Ernestine Rose’s atheism? Does she still speak to us today, or is she a historical curiosity? Is she party to some of the faults atheism is so often accused of harbouring? We can begin to answer these questions by moving forward to 1869, the year Thomas Henry Huxley felt the need to coin the term “agnosticism”. Huxley was unwilling to go as far as he felt his contemporaries had in attaining a solution to the “problem of existence”. As against their confident “gnosis” to this most intractable problem, Huxley felt sure he had not arrived at so safe a destination. But, more than that, he declared a “pretty strong conviction” that the problem was insoluble. Ernestine Rose’s address was only eight years before the arrival of agnosticism. Can her *Defence of Atheism* be seen as an exercise in hard-nosed dogmatism?

In a word, no. At no point does Ernestine Rose presume levels of knowledge unavailable to her, or contrive some grand metaphysical sweep of the arm. And she is straightforward in saying what cannot be known. Indeed, the simple appreciation of nature is more readily appreciated by the person who does not contrive some uber-natural explanation.

“As well might we use the terms Episcopalian, Unitarian, Universalist, to signify vice and corruption, as the term atheist, which means simply a disbelief in a God, because finding no demonstration of his existence, man’s reason will not allow him to believe, nor his conviction to play the hypocrite, and profess what he does not believe.”

Rose also avoided the temptation of spiritualism, then sweeping the heterodox world. Spiritualist thought was very popular among other campaigners for women’s rights. It was thought to empower women, and so provide avenues for enterprise free from the sway men held over all conventional ecclesiastical channels. Even Rose’s mentor Robert Owen succumbed to spiritualism in his last years. But Ernestine Rose was never tempted. Spiritualism, she said in 1858, was as “foolish in sentiment as it is false in principle and pernicious in practice.”

If we can acquit Rose of hubris, can she be charged with scientism? Once again, no. At no point does she theorise that science will save us or that any branch of knowledge outside of science is useless. What she says is that science has a better record than religion at providing us with reliable information about the world. Rose’s understanding of science, following that of Humboldt, stresses interdependence and underplays anthropocentrism.

What then of misotheism? Some critics accuse atheists of so overstating their opposition to God that they end up energising the deity with the power of their hatred. This has been given the title misotheism. The person most often mentioned in this respect is Friedrich Nietzsche, whose incandescent assaults on God are said to have a misotheistic quality. But this cannot be said of Ernestine Rose’s atheism. She is understandably indignant at the crass moral failure inherent in so much God-talk, and gives free rein to that indignation. But these passages are not expressed as first-person attacks on God. It is clearly the failure of humans that is her prime target. God is, after all, but a projection of human arrogances and fears, and so the injustice is misdirected if addressed personally to an empty projection. Ernestine Rose understands that.

Looking at Ernestine Rose’s atheism a century and a half on, there is only one fault it could be accused of. As part of a rhetorical conclusion, Rose lapses into what now can be seen as unhelpfully anthropocentric eulogy, using the language of faith.

“Though I cannot believe in your God whom you have failed to demonstrate, I believe in man; if I have no faith in your religion, I have faith, unbounded, unshaken faith in the principles of right, or justice, and humanity”

A few sentences later, Rose displays what could now be seen as unwarranted confidence that atheists could be free of the sort of errors committed by the religious. The “monstrous crimes” of the believer,



she wrote, could not be perpetrated by the atheist, because “knowing that belief is not voluntary, but depends on evidence, and therefore there can be no merit in the belief of any of the religions, not demerit in a disbelief in all of them, could never be guilty of.” Here Rose shows herself too sanguine. These final flourishes to her address somewhat undo the more grounded statements of the previous paragraphs. In the 21st century we see anthropocentrism, making use of the language of faith and bland progressionism as mistakes but it needs a large dose of hindsight for that to be seen clearly.

This minor fault notwithstanding, Rose cannot be seen as an example of the hubristic overreach that worried Huxley. Her atheism is grounded soundly in nature and makes no large claims. Only when declaring a faith in man does she inveigle the use of religious language in a way that can now be seen as unsuccessful. Rose’s *Defence of Atheism* understands well the limitations of atheism. Atheism is no more than the unwillingness to accept human testimony as to the existence of a God or supernatural realm.

Emphasis here has been given to the intellectual context of Rose’s address and on the thinkers who influenced her. Can it be concluded from this that her work is derivative and therefore uninteresting? Though one can spot influences in her work, it would be wrong

to conclude that it is diminished by this in any way. No work emerges without any predecessors. What Rose did was to synthesise, creatively and intelligently, into 39 paragraphs, a massive range of thinking and infuse it with an authenticity that was entirely her own.

With the quibbling exception of the final rhetorical flourish, the main impression of *A Defence of Atheism* is how contemporary it feels. It understands the limitations of atheism, which means it is remarkably free of the anthropocentrism that blights much of the transcendentalist agnosticism of the day. It is informed by science without unweaving the rainbow. And it was produced by someone with significant restrictions on her leisure to indulge in wide reading and deep thinking. Both these things happened, but in the context of a busy life – one that eventually ruined her health – in the service of others.

Rose’s atheism was an integral part of her life’s work on behalf of women’s rights and the abolition of slavery. She was not merely an abolitionist and feminist who happened to be an atheist. She was an abolitionist and feminist because she was an atheist. And, alongside Charles Bradlaugh, deserves to be seen as one of the most powerful and authentic atheists the movement has ever produced.

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
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Gandhi, Nonviolence and Truth

Shahrar Ali



This article is based on a section of talks given at the Philosopher Kings series, UEA, “Gandhi and Non-violent Direct action”, 10th February 2015, and as part of the Bloomsbury Festival “Our World? Talking Independence”, 22nd October 2017. I am grateful to audiences for their questions. Special thanks to Sevara for inspiration and support.

In this article, I seek to characterise nonviolent direct action, using Gandhi’s teachings as inspiration. Some might say that Gandhi is not the advocate that he is taken to be nor should he be held up in such esteem due to fallings short or contradictions in his own life. I am not so much interested in assessing Gandhi’s legacy as that we should be entitled to make use of his words to help us assess what is as much of a legitimate question of our times as it was in his day. What is the meaning of nonviolence as a form of political action and how does it work?

NONVIOLENCE IS INTELLIGENT

We are right in wanting to know the reasons for our actions, to render them intelligible. Sometimes the moral clarity of an act of nonviolence is compelling in the enacting. Other times we might need this to be

set out for us. We take the legitimacy of some forms of nonviolence for granted, such is their prevalence in modern society.

Take the political march - these have become ubiquitous, people coming together at a pre-arranged place, and prior schedule, armed with placards and galvanising around speeches on platforms. Gatherings around key locations, such as embassies, serve as a focus for defiance against nation states guilty of the latest oppression. In the UK, the business of freedom to associate in particular places is becoming increasingly difficult, especially since anti-terror legislation from 2000 onwards. The state has sanctioned encroachments upon our liberties, often without consultation or public consent; the tragic shooting of de Menezes in 2005 a direct result of shoot-to-kill rules of engagement having been negligently deployed.

In 2010, the infamous tossing of a fire extinguisher from a Millbank tower during the protests against student fees was not intelligent. It was dangerous and out of keeping with the spirit or letter of a non-violent approach to political action. The ability of such actions to get picked up by media, to dominate the telling of the story of the reasons for the march, can only risk undermining the cause.

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Nonviolent action is nothing if not self-disciplined. If the victim is to show themselves worthy of better governance then they must show themselves capable of self-governance. As Gandhi remarked, “Disobedience, to be civil, implies discipline, thought, care, attention.”

Rational agency and the power of persuasion is one of the chief mechanisms for addressing injustice. What better way of promulgating peaceful resolution to conflict or oppressive agency than to challenge them on grounds of the universalising precepts of a reasons-based approach? Intelligence is truth-directed and rational agency is one of our best means to engage the oppressor, if we are to be given a hearing or allowed to engineer one.

The very act of getting people around a table to talk, or even for others to facilitate exchange of views, is a sign of progress - either when an item of injustice has been brought on to the legislative agenda, so to speak, or when parties to the disagreement can be gotten to acknowledge the rights of one another to the means of mutual consensus-building.

AHIMSA AND TRUTH

The most telling feature of Gandhi’s moral compass is the insistence on the transformative potential and power of nonviolence, properly construed. I’ve spoken of the rational basis for engaging in non-cooperation against unjust states of affairs and an impulse to disrupt proceedings, out of moral consistency.

Gandhi also teaches us a harder lesson, the business of compelling the other to see our claim upon them to right their injustice. Whilst it may be questioned that Gandhi prohibits use of force in all circumstances, he unquestionably demands of us an empathetic response, to increase the chance of success and for its own sake.

“The principle of nonviolent non-cooperation... must have its root in love. Its object should not be to punish the opponent or to inflict injury upon him. Even while non-cooperating with him, we must make him feel that in us he has a friend and we should try to reach his heart by rendering him humanitarian service whenever possible.”

Let us also have before us the demands of truth:

“Ahimsa [nonviolence] and Truth are so intertwined that it is practically impossible to disentangle and separate them. They are like two sides of the same coin... Ahimsa is the means; Truth is the end.”

At the heart of how nonviolence does its work is something of a psychological truth – one cannot get another to reform their ways, nor does one get them to

participate in the making of our desired end, without granting them the moral and psychological space to change themselves.

Even our enemy is the author of their own being. Even our enemy must become our friend in order for us to be able to work on their moral improvement, to get them to improve themselves. This is the ultimate principle of nonviolence – we must get our detractor to rationalise and internalise their own contribution to the injustice and to take personal responsibility for correcting it. Consider Pascal’s psychological wager: “There is no man [or woman] more different from any other than he is from himself once in a while.”

MEANS AS ENDS

There is a commitment here to adoption of right means not foul means to obtain our goal. The end does not justify the means is a common refrain. Justice is a good example of an end that is also constrained by its means. One cannot do justice by perpetrating injustice. Sanctioning or commissioning torture and extraordinary rendition is unjust and ill-conducive to a just outcome. Continuing to imprison individuals without charge or trial on the remote island of Guantanamo is in violation of human rights and international law.

Gandhi’s emphasis on means is a commitment to the value that the ends is supposed to enjoin in the very obtaining of it. There are some means, if counselled, that would defeat the very purpose of the end. The pursuit of peace cannot be achieved through violent means and the conversion of others is best achieved through circumstances by which they could best consent. Love carries connotations of unconditional commitment. We may rail against the injustice with all our might, but we are supposed to see the perpetrators as capable of reform.

Christ’s injunction to God has the same formula: “Father forgive them, they know not what they do.” Forgiveness is the most appropriate act in a case where ignorance has caused evil-doing.

Gandhi’s teaching is as old as the Socratic one – that ignorance is the worst evil, that it is better to suffer evil than to do it. You could not possibly want to perpetrate evil – nor could you possibly will to do so knowingly – for to know evil would be to recoil from it. Therefore, perpetrators of evil must be acting in ignorance; the worst evil that can befall a person.

Gandhi’s teachings are deep, telling and deserve our utmost attention today.

Anita Strasser

A Neighbours' Event: *building community through socially-engaged photography*



The exhibition currently on display at Conway Hall features two projects that utilised participatory photographic research to facilitate social cohesion and community networks within two different blocks of flats. One is located in Trnovo, a trendy area in Slovenia's capital Ljubljana, where I lived for two years from 2007-08, the other is on the Hughesfield estate in Deptford, south-east London,

where I have lived since 2009. In both neighbourhoods, residents had raised concerns about the lack of neighbourly contact and community networks, expressing the desire to know their neighbours better and have more of a community spirit.

The concept of community and its romantic undertones needs to be approached with caution. The feelings of

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warmth, belonging and loyalty to a locality associated with community stem from the social Romanticism of the 19th century, a response to the Industrial Revolution and the “regretful” loss of tradition, which set up the dichotomy between the traditional and intimate and the modern and rational.¹ This was based on a nostalgic comparison between the good life in past rural settings and the problematic complexity of impersonal, rational urban life in the present. Community referred to a traditional way of life with close networks, clear moral values and sentimental attachment to place, incompatible with modern life in the city which was seen as fragmented, isolated and lacking cohesion.² In sociological writings, this nostalgic myth of community has been largely dispelled, with community now understood as being as much about exclusion as inclusion and as anything but a homogenous, stable and conflict-free totality.³ However, in everyday discourse, such idealised notions remain, and community still conjures up romantic sentiments of “the good old days”, which are lost in a capitalist society plagued by profound social inequalities, individual pursuits, and a decline in civic participation.⁴

This is not to say that community is not a valid concept; it may not have existed in the way social romanticists described, but ongoing debates in sociology and political philosophy demonstrate that the concept is far from redundant or incompatible with contemporary urban life. The happy, unified community may be a myth but people do seem to have an inherent need for social bonds, personal networks, and common values, as well as a sense of belonging.⁵ In times when these values are threatened, particularly in a society where most interaction is defined in economic terms, the discourse of loss and recovery becomes especially important. These sentiments were strongly expressed in Trnovo and Deptford, so I decided to investigate the affective nature of community and how feelings such as solidarity, trust and a sense of collectivity might be created through participatory photographic research and repeated social engagements.

When asked to define community, neighbours said: recognition in the staircase, a “Hello” and “How are you?”,



knowing who lives next door, feeling less afraid to knock next door if need be, some collective action such as the odd coffee morning and looking after the flowerbeds; but they also made it clear that they did not want to be in each other’s hair all the time. What struck me about these comments was this idea of community as communication, as shared dialogue between people who know one another through casual interaction.⁶ If we re-imagine community as communication, as fluid “social webs of people who know one another”,⁷ we need to focus on the social processes that achieve reciprocity, a sense of common purpose and collective action within a group of people, but without the force of constant commitment. The connections and mutuality formed, and the resulting visceral experience of community, might then enable people to face change together.⁸

With this in mind, the research projects sought to create repeated social interaction among neighbours so as to build up this shared dialogue. The first step was to introduce residents to each other, so I used photographic and textual research to put together images and texts to be used in a neighbours’ event on site. This was to enable people to read and meet each other through texts and images in order to make the first face-to-face contact easier. Working *with* my neighbours in dialogue and making them co-producers of the representation of their own lives was crucial in reducing the power divide between researcher and participant,⁹

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recognising that all knowledge is valid (and partial) and situated in human community.¹⁰ Photographs add another dimension to participatory sociological research, further reducing unequal power relationships as images, produced in an encounter with participants, can produce sociological knowledge in their own right by revealing elements of participants' lives that would otherwise remain undetected¹¹. In contemporary sociological research, written text is not seen as any less subjective than visual texts and, as such, a combination of images and text, produced in an exchange of knowledge through dialogue, seems the most effective way to provide critical insights into participants' social reality.¹²

It was also important to have this initial encounter in an informal setting on site to make it inclusive. In Ljubljana, I nailed the images and texts on the wooden sheds in the courtyard and organised a party on a warm spring afternoon and in Deptford it was home-baked cakes and tea in my flat with the images and texts hanging in my bedroom 'gallery', which I had cleared of any furniture. Not everybody came to the events; while this could easily be mistaken for a lack of interest, we need to understand that not everybody feels able to communicate in this way, as demonstrated by the subsequent visits by individuals who did engage with the material on their own terms. It must also be noted that not everybody participated in the project which, again, is not necessarily a sign of apathy as they participated in other ways such as providing food or drink for gatherings, providing encouragement, and showing interest by asking about the project. Overall, the gatherings, in groups or individually, and the printed material people could take with them was crucial not only in facilitating first-time encounters, either face-to-face or through images and texts, but also, as I learnt afterwards, in helping neighbours understand the purpose of the project better.

In the case of Ljubljana, it seemed enough for people to know who was who, to say hello and to feel less anxious, with the knowledge of who inhabits the building. Unfortunately, I was unable to follow this up further as my time in Slovenia had come to an end, but I left a folder of all the gathered materials with the chronicler of the building. When I returned in 2015, the poster for the neighbours' event was still in the glass cabinet by the gate. In Deptford,

where I have lived for more than 8 years, for some the research has acted as a catalyst for further interaction, collective activity and a greater interest in building up tighter community networks. Together we have since engaged in what is known as Tactical Urbanism: small-scale subversive activities to make a space more liveable.¹³ On an ad-hoc basis, we decorate spaces such as the 2nd floor landing or the courtyard with discarded paraphernalia to liven up the dismal and neglected communal areas. Our bemusement and audible laughter bring out others to join in and/or admire the curious displays, which have become a topic of conversation, especially when guessing who has added or removed a particular object (we have some secret participants).

Another important activity for developing a sense of belonging and membership was the transformation of the neglected courtyard into our own community garden after obtaining plants, mulch and tools from the council. With the need for regular maintenance, the garden continues to be a topic of conversation, enabling encounters with old and new neighbours and passers-by. Those keen to have more neighbourly contact also engage in food exchanges, visits to each other's homes and the odd cup of tea and chat, and in a joint effort to have repairs and maintenance carried out around the block. Overall, there is much more chatter and laughter going on in the staircase, and people have commented on how much better they feel about living here. However, one must not forget that with the constant changes of tenants in some flats (some project participants have been forced to move out due to rent increases or other reasons), this created community is very fragile and with each new tenant the dynamics in the block change again.

However, what the project has achieved is to build the foundation for a shared dialogue, community as communication, a catalyst for building social networks without the force of commitment. Although the complexity of social bonds in such everyday banalities is invisible, it is the art of coexisting with neighbours connected by proximity. Sharing experiences, territory and daily practices helps to form connections, resulting in mutuality and the visceral nature of community such as a sense of belonging, trust and solidarity.

The exhibition continues until the end of January 2018. For more information, please visit: anitastrasser.com.

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Freudian Psychoanalysis and the Russian Revolution: Tracing the Connections

David Morgan

Psychoanalysis developed during a period of revolutionary ferment in the early years of the last century. Sigmund Freud had many connections with Russia and his followers in that country made some notable contributions towards the shaping of the body of ideas that became Freudian psychoanalysis.

Writing as a socialist-feminist, Juliet Mitchell famously argued that “psychoanalysis is not a recommendation *for* a patriarchal society, but an analysis *of* one”. This point can perhaps explain why many highly educated women were attracted to Freud’s ideas and joined his “movement”, which was how he commonly described it. This article looks at some prominent Russian women who made important contributions to the early Freudian movement before and immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

THE FUSION OF MARX AND FREUD

When in 1905 revolution broke out in Russia, Tatiana Rosenthal was studying in Zurich. Rosenthal was inspired, after reading Freud’s *The Interpretation of Dreams*, to bring about a fusion of the ideas of Marx and Freud. This was seven years before Freud, in a letter to Carl Jung, was to welcome his growing support in Russia as “a local epidemic of psychoanalysis”. Another Russian pioneer analyst, Aron Zalkind, declared in



Sigmund Freud

1913 that Freud’s ideas were more popular in Russia than in the West.

Tatiana Rosenthal understood that a successful revolution meant changing people’s hearts and minds as much as shifting power and economic change. A revolution had to create the social conditions where human happiness could flourish. Rosenthal became a



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proponent of Freudian ideas in St Petersburg where she sought to implement a socialist version of psychoanalysis. Rosenthal never realised her full potential since she took her own life in 1921 while suffering depression after the birth of her child. It was left to others to achieve her “harmony of Marx and Freud”. Rosenthal’s example does point to important associations between Freudianism and the Russian revolutionary movement.

On close examination, Freud’s links with Russia prove to be far more numerous than one might expect: many of his students, patients, early followers and patrons were from that country. Russian women such as Rosenthal, Vera Schmidt, Lou Andreas-Salome and Sabina Spielrein made original contributions to Freudian theory and influenced Freud’s own ideas.

Before the October Revolution, many cultural interactions between wealthy Russians and European society provided Freud with ample opportunities to meet influential individuals from that country. He developed close friendships with fellow Russian students when he was in Paris studying under Jean-Martin Charcot, who himself had treated members of the Russian royal family. Freud described his associates in Paris as “my Russians” and they included Liberius Darkshevich, a specialist in brain anatomy and a “Dr Klikovich”, an assistant to Dr Sergei Botkin, physician to the Tsar.

Residing for most of his life in cosmopolitan *fin-de-siecle* Vienna, Freud was in regular contact with Russians and he was familiar with events in Moscow, Odessa and other major Russian cities. Russia was the Freud family homeland and for generations they were rooted in Russian Lithuania; his mother, Amalie Nathansohn, grew up in Odessa, which, coincidentally, was to become an important early centre for the growth of psychoanalysis in Russia.

Freud’s works began to be translated into the Russian language remarkably early on, which is just one indication of the successful inroads made by Freudian ideas in the country.

Freud was inspired by the Enlightenment view of progress and saw science as a means of liberating humanity. A bookish youth, his heroes were rebels such as Alexander the Great, Napoleon and Oliver Cromwell, after whom he named one of his sons.

He was an admirer of Russian culture including the writer Dostoyevsky, whom analysts still admire for the psychological insights in his novels. Freud’s collection of the Russian novelist’s works was a gift from one of his closest associates, the Russian born Max Eitingon, whose wealth is said to have come from the Russian fur

trade. Eitingon was to be a key private financial backer of the early psychoanalytical movement and was later involved in the initiative to establish free clinics that were to bring mental health treatment to poor and working class communities.

Freud’s followers in Russia believed that psychoanalysis could make a major contribution towards building the new society after 1917. At least in the early days of the revolution it seemed that Marxism and Freudianism were to be natural allies and the fusion of ideas that Rosenthal had envisaged would be achieved.

Later, Freudianism was denounced by Communists as “bourgeois individualism” and was eclipsed by the Soviet science of pedology which received official sponsorship. It also did not help the fortunes of the fledgling Freudian movement in Russia to be publicly endorsed by Leon Trotsky once his influence started to wane. The misfortunes of Freud’s followers in Soviet Russia seemed to confirm Freud’s prediction that a flirtation with revolutionary ideas would prove dangerous for his movement.

It is ironic that for several years Russia was to prove more fertile soil for the growth of Freudian ideas than his native Vienna, where the conservative medical profession denounced psychoanalysis as a “Jewish science” and even “Jewish disease”.

SABINA SPIELREIN

Sabina Spielrein has until recently suffered from an excessive concentration on her relationship with Carl Jung, who was her analyst and tutor. This sexualisation has obscured her important role within psychoanalysis. Like her fellow Russian student, Tatiana Rosenthal, Spielrein studied in Zurich, but later joined Freud’s inner circle and then returned to Russia to work as a child therapist after the revolution. She was an influential figure within Russia’s psychoanalytic movement until the 1940s but was tragically killed by invading Nazis in the summer of 1942 in Rostov. Spielrein taught Alexander Luria and Lev Vygotsky and worked alongside the Swiss clinical psychologist Jean Piaget.

It is for her original contribution to Freudian theory that she must be remembered and her long career began at a 1911 meeting of Freud’s Vienna Psychoanalytical Society when she presented what is often regarded as the earliest theory of the destructive instinct, seen by analysts as one of the vital components of human aggression. Spielrein’s essay was published in the psychoanalytical Yearbook (*Jahrbuch*) as *Destruction*

as the *Cause of Coming into Being*, where she argues that a destructive impulse or urge to destroy accompanies the sexual drive and that this shapes a person's creative potential. Freud acknowledged her thesis as an influence on his own idea about the death instinct. His admiration of her work was virtually erased from the record for a generation and her importance was only rediscovered in the last twenty years or so.

VERA SCHMIDT

Vera Schmidt was an innovator in applying Freudian theory to child development. She was the director of a nursery school in Russia run on psychoanalytical principles. Her husband, Otto Schmidt, a supporter of the Bolsheviks, shared his wife's interest in Freud. Schmidt was a People's Commissar with influence over education policy and publishing; he was a member of Narkompros (the People's Commissariat for Education) and a director of the State Publishing House (Gosizdat) from 1921-1924. From these positions he was to help spread Freud's ideas in revolutionary Russia and, under his guidance, Gosizdat published translations of works by Freud and his daughter, Anna.

In 1921 the Narkompros established the Russian Psychoanalytical Society in Moscow, whose members included Alexander Luria and Mosche Wulff, who had been promoting psychoanalysis long before 1917. The society's president was Ivan Ermakov, editor of a nine volume series of Freud's work in Russian.

Otto Schmidt was also officially responsible for the children's home, (Detski Dom in Russian) which opened in May 1921 in Moscow, sharing a building with the Psychoanalytic Institute. The orphanage was run by Vera, assisted by over fifty staff members, among whom was Sabina Spielrein, who had joined the Russian Psychoanalytical Society in 1923 and was by then seen as one of first trained psychoanalysts in the country.

In early 1923 the Schmidts travelled to Vienna to inform Freud about the children's home and to report the good news about the growth of psychoanalysis in Russia. Their discussions focused on child psychoanalysis and the reorganisation of Russian education. In 1924 the Russian Psychoanalytic Association became an associate member of Freud's International Psychoanalytic Association and Vera Schmidt became its secretary in 1927. In that year, her book *Psychoanalytical Education in Soviet Russia* was published in Leipzig by the International Psychoanalytical Publishing House. Her book, based on



Lou Andreas-Salome at the Psychoanalytic Congress, 1911

work in the Detski Dom, was widely cited by analysts including Wilhelm Reich. Sadly, in 1925 the children's home was closed by the authorities, terminating the innovative work.

In 1930, after the Russian Psychoanalytical Society was dissolved, Vera Schmidt worked at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences Experimental Institute of Defectology carrying out research under Lev Vygotsky. Schmidt died at only 48 years while being operated on for a thyroid tumour.

LOU ANDREAS-SALOME

By the time Lou Andreas-Salome made contact with Freud in 1911, her fame as a writer and personality extended right across Europe. Too often dismissed as a *femme fatale*, Andreas-Salome was a remarkably independent-minded woman who managed to live entirely on income derived from her writing. She believed in the ideal of an intellectual friendship between man and woman but her good looks tended to attract romantic obsessives. She found this ideal friendship when she met Freud and remained one of his closest allies for 25 years.

In his correspondence with Freud, Jung pointed to Andreas-Salome's infamous association with the philosopher Nietzsche which had ended in Nietzsche's mental breakdown: he had asked to marry her three times but each time she refused. "Frau Lou", as she became known, was an outspoken feminist, novelist and author of a study of Ibsen's heroines. She first came

to Freud's attention when she submitted an article on "sublimation" for the *Jahrbuch*. Freud's response to her request to study psychoanalysis was initially sceptical; he asked if she had not mistaken him for Santa Claus. But he grew to respect her originality and passionate Russian nature. Andreas-Salome was an instinctive rebel who had kept a photo of Vera Zasulich hidden in her desk drawer during her school days.

Andreas-Salome had earlier explored psychological themes of love and loss in her own writings, such as her collection of short stories, *In the Twilight Zone*, published in 1902. Her study of the fateful force of love and desire, titled *Eroticism (Die Erotik)*, appeared a year before she met Freud. She felt that his theories confirmed her own independently observed insights.

Andreas-Salome explained her special empathy for Freud's theories by her experience of growing up in St Petersburg among "the Russian people with their rich and self-evident inner nature". She believed that the melancholic Russian character was particularly suited to analysis. Andreas-Salome eventually became known as "the mother of psychoanalysis".

THE FREE CLINICS MOVEMENT

A crucial factor driving psychoanalysis in the immediate post-war period was the urgent need to find medical cures for the war traumas suffered by injured soldiers returning with shell shock from the front. This problem became a major concern of Freud, Max Eitingon, Sandor Ferenczi in Hungary and other Freudians. While Freud has been unfairly accused of treating only wealthy clients, in reality he always had a strong sense of social mission which manifested itself in his support for the provision of treatment for less well-off patients, through free clinics.

The free clinics reflected the involvement of Freud and the psychoanalytical movement in social justice and political change. From 1920 to 1938, in ten cities across seven countries, including Russia, psychoanalysts inspired by Freud's Budapest speech founded free treatment centres for those who were unable to pay. The first clinic was the Berlin Poliklinik set up in 1920 by Max Eitingon, who financed and headed its administration. The post-war period was to prove crucial for the making of Freudian psychoanalysis and saw its eventual acceptance by the conservative medical profession.

CONCLUSION

The Russian Revolution created the conditions for constructing a new society where each individual would be free to fulfil his or her potential and to contribute towards the common good. Psychoanalysts, who formed an emerging branch of the medical profession, were attracted to the revolution in the belief that they could assist in the building of this new society by helping to alleviate the traumas and mental illnesses prevalent at the time. It is no accident that many talented analysts chose to specialise in child care, child development and education, since, after all, children represented the future and to help children become exemplary citizens ("new Soviet men and women"), with well-rounded identities, was a task well suited to the mission of the psychoanalytical movement.

The aim of this article has been to provide a brief introduction to the work of these Russian women who made an important contribution to psychoanalysis and in the belief that much can still be learned from them and their work.



Reg. Charity No. 1156033

Founded in 1793, the Society is a progressive movement whose Charitable Objects are: *the advancement of study, research and education in humanist ethical principles.*

We invite people who identify with our aims, principles and objects to join our society. The Society maintains the Humanist Library and Archives. The Society's journal, the *Ethical Record*, is issued quarterly. Conway Hall's educational programmes include Thinking on Sunday, London Thinks, discussions, debates and lectures, courses, and Sunday concerts of chamber music. Memorials, funerals, weddings, and baby naming ceremonies can also be arranged.

THE ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION IS £35 (£25 IF A FULL-TIME STUDENT, UNWAGED OR OVER 65)

Grace Gelder

Photographer-in-Residence at Conway Hall

Since spring 2017 I have been developing a programme of photography-related events at Conway Hall. As the venue has been home to such a lot of different gatherings throughout its time, it regularly serves the function as a container for thinking, meeting, discussion and leisure. My own first steps over the threshold, were to use the toilet whilst waiting for a demo to begin in Red Lion Square circa 2003!

As a venue for public events, the space itself can often become somewhere that you pass through without needing to look too carefully, or it becomes merely a canvas to create your own environment.

After nine months of being a photographer in residence I have started to get more of a feel for the building. Sometimes I am watching groups explore the corridors and corners with their cameras, sometimes I am working alone or with one other person on a shoot. Each time the process results in a new perspective on the building; seeing it with fresh eyes and discovering new places to make interesting images. I enjoy viewing the work that participants create at workshops and having to ask – which part of the building is that then?

The history of Conway Hall inspires me and those that I teach very much. I often share some anecdotes at the beginning of a workshop and talk about Moncure Conway and his progressive beliefs as an abolitionist and feminist. I like to think that these stories further encourage a radical approach to photography and the building certainly acts as a supportive backdrop for artistic experimentation and exploration.



On a quiet day, when I am running a workshop and many of the other spaces – particularly the hall – are empty, participants can wander further and connect more with the stories. The inscription above the stage - To Thine Own Self Be True - acts a supportive reminder for those who visit to be creative and definitely for those who are having their photograph taken.



Grace Gelder is a London-based photographer and arts workshop facilitator with a BA Honours in Visual Performance and an MA in Photography. For the last nine years she has been facilitating photography workshops and receiving private commissions from a range of clients and groups; often collaborating with charities and organisations that support women's equality and wellbeing. Grace has developed a variety of approaches to the traditional structure of a photo-shoot and continues to research the role of photographer and subject, exploring new understandings of the ethics of image-making. Grace has worked with Tate, V&A, BBC, The Photographers' Gallery and Wellcome Collection, amongst others.

The first course I worked on at Conway Hall was a portrait photography workshop with Lorna Robertson which was spread over two Saturdays. The sessions enabled the participants to explore the architecture of the building and the range of possibilities that it offers for portraiture. We also worked outside in the surrounding streets and Red Lion Square, creating portraits of strangers with and without their permission. As part of the workshop there was the option of attending The Conway Collective's theatre and movement rehearsals, where the photographers could practice working with performers. I went to support them during the first evening and Luke Dixon (co-founder of the collective) and I realised that something very interesting happened when photographers were photographing performers who were improvising. It appeared that the photographers became part of the piece, moving delicately around the performers; adding another layer of improvisation.

These observations led Luke and I to devise a workshop for photographers and performers, which we held in the Library in April. The theme was "Resistance" and we explored the dynamics between photographers and those being photographed, performers and non-performers and the way that resistance could be captured in an image. The resulting images from both workshops were shown in a month-long exhibition of photography throughout May and June. This November we were invited to create a similar workshop at The Photographers' Gallery in response to their 4 Saints in 3 Acts exhibition – a collection of images from the ground-breaking opera of the same name. This commission wouldn't have been possible

without the support of Conway Hall, who regularly allow Luke and I to try out new ideas.

The most recent workshop I did was in collaboration with Storyteller Imogen Di Sapia, and it was held in the library. Imogen told two different stories from northern hemisphere folklore which we used as inspiration to create portraits. The library's fireplace and archive of radical & humanist literature was the perfect inspiration and some of my favourite images of any workshop were made that day.

Alongside the workshops and courses for adults I run Young Photographers London with Niaz Maleknia, and we often use Conway Hall as a starting point before taking groups of 8-18 year olds out into central London to capture the atmosphere. In the new year we are looking to develop a programme of workshops for young people with special educational needs and disabilities to uphold the values of inclusivity and accessibility that are at the heart of the venue.

I also hold regular monthly meetings in the library so that anyone who has attended a workshop or course and wants to keep the flame of photographic inspiration burning has a place to share ideas and learn about other photographers' work. Topics have ranged from Politics to Creative Projects to the transformational potential of photography as a therapeutic tool. We'll be meeting again in the new year and everyone is welcome to join us.

In October, we'll be showcasing the work that has been created by course participants – both young and old! And in November I'll be having my first solo exhibition at Conway Hall, so keep an eye out for details of both private views and I look forward to seeing you there.



KARL POPPER, SCIENCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT



AN IDEA TO HELP SAVE THE WORLD (PROLOGUE)

Here is an idea that just might save the world. It is that science, properly understood, provides us with the methodological key to the salvation of humanity.

A version of this idea can be found buried in the works of Karl Popper. Famously, Popper argued that science cannot verify theories but can only refute them. This sounds very negative but actually it is not, for science succeeds in making such astonishing progress by subjecting its theories to sustained, ferocious

attempted falsification. Every time a scientific theory is refuted by experiment or observation, scientists are forced to try to think up something better and it is this, according to Popper, which drives science forward.

Popper went on to generalise this falsificationist conception of scientific method to form a notion of rationality, *critical rationalism*, applicable to all aspects of human life. Falsification becomes the more general idea of *criticism*. Just as scientists make progress by



Dr Nicholas Maxwell has devoted much of his working life to arguing that we need to bring about a revolution in academic enquiry so that it seeks and promotes wisdom and does not just acquire knowledge. He has published twelve books on this theme – as well as many articles, some on such diverse subjects as the philosophy of the natural and social sciences, the humanities, quantum theory, causation, the mind-body problem, aesthetics, and moral philosophy. For nearly 30 years he taught philosophy of science at University College London, where he is now Emeritus Reader. In 2003 he founded Friends of Wisdom, an international group of academics and educationalists.

subjecting their theories to sustained, attempted empirical falsification, so too all of us, whatever we may be doing, can best hope to achieve progress by subjecting relevant ideas to sustained, severe *criticism*. By subjecting our attempts at solving our problems to criticism, we give ourselves the best hope of discovering (when relevant) that our attempted solutions are inadequate or fail, and we are thus compelled to try to think up something better. By means of judicious use of criticism, in personal, social and political life, we may be able to achieve, in life, progressive success somewhat like the progressive success achieved by science. We can, in this way, in short, learn from scientific progress how to make personal and social progress in life. Science, as I have said, provides the methodological key to our salvation.

I discovered Karl Popper's work when I was a graduate student doing philosophy at Manchester University, in the early 1960s. As an undergraduate, I was appalled at the triviality, the sterility, of so-called "Oxford philosophy". This turned its back on all the immense and agonizing problems of the real world – the mysteries and grandeur of the universe, the wonder of our life on Earth, the dreadful toll of human suffering – and instead busied itself with the trite activity of analysing the meaning of words. Then I discovered Popper and breathed a sigh of relief. Here was a philosopher who, with exemplary intellectual integrity and passion, concerned himself with the profound problems of human existence, and had extraordinarily original and fruitful things to say about them. The problems that had tormented me had in essence, I felt, already been solved.

But then it dawned on me that Popper had failed to solve his fundamental problem – the problem of understanding how science makes progress. In one respect, Popper's conception of science is highly unorthodox: all scientific knowledge is conjectural; theories are falsified but cannot be verified. But, in other respects, Popper's conception of science is highly orthodox. For Popper, as for most scientists and philosophers, the basic aim of science is knowledge of truth, the basic method being to assess theories with respect to evidence, *nothing being accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence*. This orthodox view – which I came to call *standard empiricism* – is, I realised, *false*. Physicists only ever accept theories that are *unified* – theories that depict the same laws applying to the range of phenomena to which the theory applies. Endlessly many empirically more

successful *disunified* rivals can always be concocted, but these are always ignored. This means, I realised, that science does make a big, permanent, and highly problematic assumption about the nature of the universe, independently of empirical considerations and even, in a sense, in violation of empirical considerations – namely that the universe is such that all grossly *disunified* theories are false. Without a presupposition such as this, the whole empirical method of science breaks down.

It occurred to me that Popper, along with most scientists and philosophers, had misidentified the basic aim of science. This is not truth per se, it is rather truth *presupposed to be unified*, presupposed to be explanatory or comprehensible (unified theories being *explanatory*). Inherent in the aim of science there is the metaphysical – that is, untestable – assumption that there is some kind of underlying *unity* in nature. The universe is, in some way, physically comprehensible.

But this assumption is profoundly problematic. We do not *know* that the universe is comprehensible. This is conjecture. Even if it is comprehensible, almost certainly it is not comprehensible in the way science presupposes it is today. For good Popperian reasons, this metaphysical assumption must be made explicit within science and subjected to sustained *criticism*, as an integral part of science, in an attempt to improve it.

The outcome is a new conception of science, and a new kind of science, which I called *aim-oriented empiricism*. This subjects the aims, and associated methods, of science to sustained critical scrutiny, the aims and methods of science evolving with evolving knowledge. Philosophy of science (the study of the aims and methods of science) becomes an integral, vital part of science itself. And science becomes much more like natural philosophy in the time of Newton, a synthesis of science, methodology, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy.

The aim of seeking *explanatory truth* is, however, a special case of a more general aim, that of seeking *valuable truth*. And this is sought in order that it be *used* by people to enrich their lives. In other words, in addition to metaphysical assumptions inherent in the aims of science there are *value* assumptions, and *political* assumptions, assumptions about how science should be used in life. These are, if anything, even more problematic than metaphysical assumptions. Here, too, assumptions need to be made explicit and critically assessed, as an integral part of science, in an attempt to improve them.

Released from the crippling constraints of standard empiricism, science would burst out into a wonderful new life, realising its full potential, responding fully both to our sense of wonder and to human suffering, becoming both more rigorous and of greater human value.

And then, in a flash of inspiration, I had my great idea. I could tread a path parallel to Popper's. Just as Popper had generalised falsificationism to form critical rationalism, so I could generalise my aim-orientated empiricist conception of scientific method to form an aim-orientated conception of rationality, potentially fruitfully applicable to all that we do, to all spheres of human life. But the great difference would be this: I would be starting out from a conception of science – of scientific method – that enormously improves on Popper's notion. In generalizing this, to form a general idea of progress-achieving rationality, I would be creating an idea of immense power and fruitfulness.

I knew already that the line of argument developed by Popper, from falsificationism to critical rationalism, was of profound importance for our whole culture and social order, and had far-reaching implications and application for science, art and art criticism, literature, music, academic inquiry quite generally, politics, law, morality, economics, psychoanalytic theory, evolution, education, history – for almost all aspects of human life and culture. The analogous line of argument I was developing, from aim-oriented empiricism to aim-oriented rationalism, would have even more fruitful implications and applications for all these fields, starting as it did from a much improved initial conception of the progress-achieving methods of science.

The key point is extremely simple. It is not just in science that aims are profoundly problematic. This is true in life as well. Above all, it is true of the aim of creating a good world – an aim inherently problematic for all sorts of more or less obvious reasons. It is not just in science that problematic aims are misconstrued or “repressed”; this happens all too often in life too, both at the level of individuals, and at the institutional or social level as well.

We urgently need to build into our scientific institutions and activities the aims-and-methods-improving methods of aim-orientated empiricism, so that scientific aims and methods improve as our scientific knowledge and understanding improve. Likewise, and even more urgently, we need to build into all our other institutions, into the fabric of our personal and social

lives, the aims-and-methods-improving methods of aim-orientated rationality, so that we may improve our personal, social and global aims and methods as we live.

One outcome of the 20th century is a widespread and deep-seated cynicism concerning the capacity of humanity to make real progress towards a genuinely civilised, good world. Utopian ideals and programmes, whether of the far left or right, that have promised heaven on earth, have led to horrors. Stalin's and Hitler's grandiose plans led to the murder of millions. Even saner, more modest, more humane and rational political programmes, based on democratic socialism, liberalism, or free markets and capitalism, seem to have failed us. Thanks largely to modern science and technology, many of us today enjoy far richer, healthier and longer lives than our grandparents or great grandparents, or those who came before. Nevertheless the modern world is confronted by grave global problems: the lethal character of modern war, the spread and threat of armaments, conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear, rapid population growth, severe poverty of millions in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, destruction of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, rapid extinction of species, annihilation of languages and cultures. And over everything hangs the menace of climate change, threatening to intensify all the other problems (apart, perhaps, from population growth).

All of these grave global problems are the almost inevitable outcome of the successful exploitation of science and technology plus the failure to build aim-orientated rationality into the fabric of our personal, social and institutional lives. Modern science and technology make modern industry and agriculture possible, which in turn make possible population growth, modern armaments and war, destruction of natural habitats and extinction of species, and global warming. Modern science and technology, in other words, make it possible for us to achieve the goals of more people, more industry and agriculture, more wealth, longer lives, more development, housing and roads, more travel, more cars and aeroplanes, more energy production and use, more and more lethal armaments – for defence only, of course!. These things seem inherently desirable and, in many ways, are highly desirable. But our successes in achieving these ends also bring about global warming, war, vast inequalities across the globe, destruction of habitats and extinction of species. All our current

global problems are the almost inevitable outcome of our long-term failure to put aim-orientated rationality into practice in life, so that we actively seek to discover problems associated with our long-term aims, actively explore ways in which problematic aims can be modified in less problematic directions, and at the same time develop the social, the political, economic and industrial *muscle* able to change what we do, how we live, so that our aims become less problematic, less destructive in both the short and long term. We have failed even to appreciate the fundamental need to improve aims and methods as the decades go by. Conventional ideas about rationality are all about *means*, not about *ends*, and are not designed to help us *improve* our ends as we proceed. Implementing aim-oriented rationality is essential if we are to survive in the long term. To repeat, the idea spelled out in my book, if taken seriously, just might save the world.

Einstein put his finger on what is wrong when he said “Perfection of means and confusion of goals seems, to my opinion, to characterise our age.” This outcome is inevitable if we restrict rationality to *means*, and fail to demand that rationality – the authentic article – must quite essentially include the sustained critical scrutiny of *ends*.

Scientists, and academics more generally, have a heavy burden of responsibility for allowing our present impending state of crisis to develop. Putting aim-oriented rationality into practice in life can be painful, difficult and counter-intuitive. It involves calling into question some of our most cherished aspirations and

ideals. We have to *learn* how to live in aim-oriented rationalistic ways. And here, academic inquiry ought to have taken a lead. The primary task of our schools and universities, indeed, ought to have been, over the decades, to help us learn how to improve aims and methods as we live. Not only has academia failed miserably to take up this task, or even see it as necessary or desirable but, even worse perhaps, academia has failed itself to put aim-orientated rationality into practice. Science has met with such astonishing success because it has put something like aim-orientated empiricism into scientific practice – but this has been obscured and obstructed by the conviction of scientists that science ought to proceed in accordance with standard empiricism – with its fixed aim and fixed methods. Science has achieved success despite, and not because of, general allegiance of scientists to standard empiricism.

The pursuit of scientific knowledge dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help humanity improve aims and methods in life is, as we have seen, a recipe for disaster. This is the crisis behind all the others. We are in deep trouble. We can no longer afford to blunder blindly on our way. We must strive to peer into the future and steer a course less doomed to disaster. Humanity must learn to take intelligent and humane responsibility for the unfolding of history.

The book can be accessed free online at: <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ucl-press/browse-books/karl-popper-science-and-enlightenment>.

THE HUMANIST LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES

Conway Hall Humanist Library and Archives is home to a unique collection of published and archival sources on humanism and its related subjects. We are open for members, researchers and the general public on Tuesdays to Thursdays from 10 till 17. Our collections include printed materials such as books, pamphlets and journals as well as archival material of unpublished institutional and personal records and papers, such as manuscripts, letters and photographs. For your time and convenience it is advisable to contact the library before your visit so we can ensure the material you seek is available.

Tel: 020 7061 6747.

Email: sophie@conwayhall.org.uk

10 am – 5 pm Open Tuesday to Thursday

THINKING ON SUNDAY

Start at 11.00 unless specified otherwise.

Jan 14	Evidence-based policing <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Richard Honess</i>
Jan 21	Is physicalism the correct world-view? <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>For: Ian Buxton</i> • <i>Against: Ray Tallis</i>
Feb 25	A defence of libertarian free will <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Robert Lockie</i>
Mar 4	Electromagnetism - you can't live without it <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Dr Peter Ford MBE</i>
Mar 11	Sortition - back to the future for proper democracy <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Brett Hennig</i>

TALKS, DEBATES & LECTURES

Jan 22	Future Democracy: Alternative Models of Democracy <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Andy Paice, Peter Cross (Sortition Foundation), Max Kelis (Start) or Conor Gearty</i>
Jan 26	Conway Hall Book Club (see website for book title and author/translator)
Jan 27	Corin Redgrave Memorial Lecture: Is The Era of Universal Human Rights coming to an end? <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Professor Conor Gearty</i>
Feb 23	Conway Hall Book Club (see website for book title and author/translator)

SIX WEEK COURSES

From Jan 31	a school of thought: a way with words <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Adam Ramejkis</i>
From Feb 15	London's Agitators & Protesters: 1880s–1980s <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>David Rosenberg</i>

Events subject to alteration • See conwayhall.org.uk for the latest information

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SUNDAY CONCERTS

January

7th	5.30pm	Roderick Swanston + PRE-CONCERT TALK
	6.30pm	I Musicanti SCHUBERT/KODALY/SCHUBERT
14th	6.30pm	Eusebius Quartet HAYDN/KORNGOLD/MENDELSSOHN
21st	5.30pm	Interview with Karel Janovicky + PRE-CONCERT TALK
	6.30pm	Dvořák Piano Quartet MOZART/KAREL JANOVICKY/DVOŘÁK
28th	5.30pm	Ashok Klouda: <i>Sunday Suites 4</i> + PRE-CONCERT RECITAL
	6.30pm	Minguet Quartet MENDELSSOHN/GINASTERA/SCHUMANN

February

4th	6.30pm	Simon Callaghan & Friends SCHUBERT
11th	1.00pm	Princeton High School Orchestra Concert + SPECIAL EVENT
	6.30pm	Piatti Quartet & Aidan Smith BRIDGE/RICHARD REASON/DEBUSSY
18th	5.30pm	Ashok Klouda: <i>Sunday Suites 5</i> + PRE-CONCERT RECITAL
	6.30pm	Hiro Takenouchi & Sinfonia Cymru STERNDALÉ BENNETT/MENDELSSOHN
25th	6.30pm	Aquinas Piano Trio MOZART/SAINT-SAËNS/BRAHMS

March

4th	5.30pm	Ashok Klouda: <i>Sunday Suites 6</i> + PRE-CONCERT RECITAL
	6.30pm	Engegård Quartet HAYDN/BARTÓK/SVENDSEN/FOLK SONGS
11th	5.30pm	Roderick Swanston + PRE-CONCERT TALK
	6.30pm	Wihan Quartet RICHTER/HAYDN/JOSEF SUK
18th	6.30pm	Coull Quartet & Mark Bebbington JOHN IRELAND/IAN VENABLES/BRAHMS
25th	6.30pm	Maggini Quartet HAYDN/VAUGHAN WILLIAMS/SCHUBERT

April

8th	6.30pm	Louise Kemény & Friends SCHUBERT/BRAHMS/JOSEPH MARX/ZEMLINSKY
15th	6.30pm	Linos Piano Trio DEBUSSY/BEETHOVEN/CPE BACH/RAVEL
22nd	6.30pm	Benyounes Quartet HAYDN/BARTÓK/BEETHOVEN
29th	6.30pm	Accio Trio HAYDN/BEETHOVEN/SMETANA/SHOSTAKOVICH

May

6th	6.30pm	Simon Callaghan & Friends SCHUBERT
13th	6.30pm	Atéa Wind Quintet & Ausiàs Garrigós Morant BRITTEN/GERNOT WOLFGANG/MOZART/RAVEL/BRUNO/BELTHOISE/BOZZA/MLADI
20th	6.30pm	Zoffany Ensemble SCHUBERT/BRAHMS
27th	5.30pm	Nicolas Southon + PRE-CONCERT TALK
	6.30pm	Gémeaux Quartet & Oliver Wass DEBUSSY/CAPLET/DEBUSSY/RAVEL

June

3rd	6.30pm	London Mozart Players Chamber Ensemble & Simon Callaghan MOZART/BEETHOVEN/BOTTESINI/HAYDN
10th	6.30pm	Avant-guarding Mompou + SPECIAL EVENT

For more information & tickets, visit: conwayhall.org.uk